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Theory of mindSchizophrenia typically involves poor social functioning. This may be due, in part, to deﬁcits in theory-of-mind,
the cognitive ability to reason ﬂexibly about the mental states of others. Patients also have deﬁcits in social
knowledge. It is currently unclear how these two impairments interrelate in schizophrenia. To address this
issue, 43 patients with schizophrenia and 25 healthy controls completed two theory-of-mind tests and a novel
test of social judgment. This latter measure required participants to judge whether various social behaviors
were normal or reasonable in the context in which the behaviors occurred. Whereas patients demonstrated
clear deﬁcits in theory-of-mind, they performed similarly to controls when judging socially appropriate behav-
iors and violations of social norms. Patients, however, were less likely than controls to judge social behavior as
reasonable when the behavior was impolite but understandable if the characters’ thoughts were taken into ac-
count. This latter difﬁculty correlated with patients’ performance deﬁcits on the theory-of-mind tasks. Overall,
ﬁndings suggest that basic social knowledge is intact in schizophrenia, though judgments of social behavior
are affected by patients’ theory-of-mind deﬁcits.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Schizophrenia typically involves poor social functioning. Patients
with schizophrenia, for example, display poorer social skills and report
fewer close relationships than patients without schizophrenia (Green
et al., 2008; Hooley, 2008). These social impairments can cause consid-
erable suffering to patients and also interfere with functional outcomes,
such as education and employment (Couture et al., 2006; Green et al.,
2008). The social impairments associatedwith schizophreniamay result
in part from deﬁcits in social cognition — “the mental operations that
underlie social interactions, including perceiving, interpreting, and
generating responses to the intentions, dispositions, and behaviors of
others” (Green et al., 2008, p. 1).
Social cognition can be conceived as comprising both “ﬂuid” and
“crystallized” abilities — a distinction commonly used by researchers
of intelligence. An example of a “ﬂuid” ability is “theory of mind”
(ToM)— the cognitive ability to reason ﬂexibly about the mental states
of others in social contexts. ToM is required to negotiate dynamic social
interactions and interpret ambiguous social cues, and there is strong
evidence that patients with schizophrenia have deﬁcits in this ability
(Bora and Pantelis, 2013; Bora et al., 2009). An example of a “crystallized”
ability is social knowledge. This declarative knowledge – in the form of
understanding roles, protocols, and goals of social interactions – permits
rule-based reasoning of social exchanges. Acquired social knowledge
of this type is also critical to normal social functioning and previousScience, Macquarie University,
9385 2200.
nnors).
Inc. This is an open access article unresearch suggests that it is similarly deﬁcient in schizophrenia (Green
et al., 2008).
Previous researchhas assessed social knowledge in schizophrenia by
asking patients to answer questions about general social issues
(e.g., why do you think the divorce rate is going up? Cutting and
Murphy, 1990; Muñoz et al., 1992; Upthegrove et al., 2002), recall se-
quences of typical behaviors in routine social scripts (e.g., going to the
supermarket; Chan et al., 1999; Matsui et al., 2006, 2009), or identify
roles, rules, and goals in social scenarios (Addington and Piskulic,
2011; Addington et al., 2006). In all such tasks, patients with schizo-
phrenia perform worse than healthy controls. Performance deﬁcits on
these tasks, however,may reﬂectmore general difﬁculties with abstract
thinking and semantic memory (i.e., generalized knowledge about con-
cepts and objects), both of which are well-known to be affected in
schizophrenia (Doughty and Done, 2009).
Given these limitations, it is unclear the extent to which social
knowledge is impaired in schizophrenia. Social deﬁcits in schizophrenia
usually becomemost apparent around the time of illness onset. It is pos-
sible, therefore, that a signiﬁcant proportion of people who develop
schizophrenia have had sufﬁcient ToM ability earlier in their life to ac-
quire adequate social knowledge. These individuals would not have
been noticed by clinicians early in their life, unlike young individuals
with autism, and, even after the onset of their illness, may retain what
social knowledge they acquired earlier. The ability of these individuals,
however, to access and/or demonstrate their social knowledge on cog-
nitively demanding tasks may decline with the onset and progression
of their illness. This proposal predicts a dissociation between impaired
ToM and intact social knowledge if the latter is assessed using less de-
manding tasks.der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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autism research (Ellis et al., 1994). The original version of this task re-
quired participants to rate behaviors in various social scenarios in
terms of how normal or expected the behaviors were. There are two
key advantages of this task. First, it does not rely on semantic memory
in the same way as previous measures of social knowledge and is also
less cognitively demanding. Second, it assesses participants’ application
of their knowledge of social norms to judge other people’s behavior. The
task therefore seems particularly relevant to understanding social difﬁ-
culties in people with schizophrenia, since judgments of this type are
often mistaken or misguided in these individuals, triggering interper-
sonal conﬂict. The primary disadvantage of the original version of this
task, however, is that judging some of the behaviors presented in the
original version conﬂated ToM and the application of rule-based social
knowledge. To tease these capacities apart, we adapted ﬁve of the orig-
inal stories to ask participants to judge three types of behavior: (1) be-
havior that is appropriate according to social norms; (2) violations of
social norms; and (3) impolite behavior that is understandable if the
characters’ thoughts are taken into account (see Appendix for an exam-
ple). Participants were required to categorize each type of behavior as
either normal, unusual, or shocking.
If normative social knowledge is intact in schizophrenia, while ToM
is impaired, it was hypothesized that patients would judge the socially
appropriate behaviors and the violations of social norms like controls,
but would be less likely than controls to judge the impolite but under-
standable behaviors as normal. It was also expected that this latter difﬁ-
culty would correlate with patients’ performance deﬁcits on ToM tasks.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Forty-three patients (24males, 19 females) of mean age 41.53 years
(SD=9.58; range 24–60) were recruited from the Volunteer Register
administered by the Australian Schizophrenia Research Bank
(Loughland et al., 2010). Thirty-two patients had a diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia and 11 had a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, conﬁrmed
using the Diagnostic Interview for Psychosis (DIP; Castle et al., 2006);
and consistent with DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). Twenty-ﬁve healthy controls (10 males, 15 females) of mean
age 41.3 years (SD=13.8; range 19 to 60)were recruited from the gen-
eral community and screened using the affective, psychotic, and sub-
stance abuse screening modules from the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV Axis 1 Disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1996).
All participants were required to speak English as their ﬁrst lan-
guage. Exclusion criteria for both groups included history of head injury
(unconscious for greater than one hour), neurological illness, and sub-
stance dependence (met criteria for a DSM-IV diagnosis for two or
more of the last ﬁve years). All participants gave written informed con-
sent. The experiment was approved by the local human research ethics
committee and followed principles outlined in the World Medical
Association Declaration of Helsinki–Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects.
2.2. Materials and procedure
Participants completed the following tasks, after which patients
were interviewed using the DIP to conﬁrm diagnosis and the Scales
for Assessment of Positive and Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia
(SAPS and SANS; Andreasen, 1983, 1984) to rate symptom severity,
while controls were screened using the SCID. IQ was estimated using
the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson andWillison, 1991). All testing
and interviewing were conducted by experienced clinical researchers.
ToMwas assessed using two tasks. The ﬁrst was a verbal story com-
prehension task based on Harrington et al.’s (2005) ToM task. Partici-
pants read four stories with accompanying cartoons and answeredquestions that required ToM to comprehend either deception or a char-
acter’s false belief. For each story, participants predicted the character’s
behavior (correct response =1) and explained why the character
would behave in this way (explicitly correct response =2, partially
correct =1, and incorrect =0). Scores were summed across stories.
Participants also had to answer a factual control question about each
story (correct response =1). These scores were likewise summed
across stories.
The second ToMmeasure was a non-verbal picture-sequencing task
(Langdon and Coltheart, 1999; Langdon et al., 2010, 2014). Participants
were shown four picture-cards in a prearranged incorrect order and re-
quired to rearrange them to depict a logical sequence of events. There
were four types of sequences (four sequences per type): ToM “false-
belief stories” that involved going beyond the immediate objective in-
formation to infer a character’s mistaken belief; “social-script stories”
that controlled for simple social reasoning; “mechanical stories” that
controlled for physical cause-and-effect reasoning; and “capture
stories” that controlled for inhibition of an obvious but misleading cue.
Each sequence scored two points if theﬁrst cardwas positioned correct-
ly, two points if the last cardwas correct, and one point each for the sec-
ond and third cards being correct. Scores were averaged across each
type of story (range 0–6).
To assess social judgment, participants read ﬁve vignettes that each
involved three types of social behavior: socially appropriate, violations
of social norms, and inappropriate but understandable if character’s
thoughts were taken into account. These three types of behavior were
presented in a ﬁxed pseudo-random order across stories. Participants
categorized each behavior as either normal (or reasonable), unusual
(or strange), or shocking (or odd). For each type of social behavior,
the percentage of behaviors assigned to these three categories
was calculated.
2.3. Statistical analyses
Patients and controls’ demographic variables were compared using
independent sample t-tests and chi-square tests. For the ToM story
comprehension task, independent sample t-tests were used to compare
the performance of patients and controls. For the ToM picture-
sequencing task, a 2 (group: patient vs. control) × 4 (story type: false-
belief versus the three control conditions) mixed ANOVA was used. If
the two-way interaction proved signiﬁcant, simple contrasts, using in-
dependent sample t-tests, were also reported for each story type. For
the social judgment task, a 2 (group: patient vs. control) × 3 (condition:
socially appropriate, violation of social norm, impolite but understand-
able) × 3 (response: normal, unusual, shocking) mixed ANOVA was
used. If the three-way interaction proved signiﬁcant, post hoc analysis
used separate 2 (group) × 3 (response) ANOVAs for each of the three
conditions. Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used if Mauchly’s test
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated. The
alpha level was set at p= .05 for each task.
To examine relationships with ToM, a composite ToM score was
derived from summing the standardized z-scores of the verbal and
non-verbal ToM scores. Analysis focused on the Pearson correlations
between this composite score and thepercentage of “normal” responses
per condition in the social judgment task. Correlations between
the composite measure of ToM and basic demographics and clinical
ratings – speciﬁcally, IQ, education, and SAPS and SANS total scores –
were also examined. Partial correlations between ToM and “normal”
responses in the social judgment task were conducted controlling for
any demographic or clinical variables that correlated with ToM. Given
the number of correlations, an adjusted alpha level of p= .01was used.
3. Results
Patients and controls did not differ signiﬁcantly in age, gender-ratio
or NART-estimated IQ, although controls had more years of education
Fig. 1. Patients’ and controls’ ratings across the three conditions of the social judgment task. Error bars represent standard errors. ** p b .01.
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phrenia (mean duration of illness =16.24 years; SD =7.15; range
4–31 years) with mild symptoms (mean SAPS global rating of 1.9;
mean SANS global rating of 1.9).
Patients showed signiﬁcant deﬁcits on both ToM tasks. In the story
comprehension task, patients performed worse than controls on ToM
questions but not on control questions (see Table 2). In the picture-
sequencing task, a 2 (group: patient vs. control) × 4 (story type: false-
belief versus the three control conditions) mixed ANOVA revealed a
signiﬁcant interaction of group by story type, F(2.45, 161.83) =4.26,
p= .01. This occurred because patients performed worse than controls
on the false-belief stories that required ToM, but not on the control
stories (see Table 2 for simple contrasts).
Patients showed a more complicated pattern of responding in the
social judgment task. A 2 (group: patient vs. control) × 3 (condition: so-
cially appropriate, violations, inappropriate but understandable) × 3
(response: normal, unusual, shocking) mixed ANOVA revealed a signif-
icant main effect of response and two-way interaction of condition by
response that were incorporated into a signiﬁcant three-way interac-
tion, F(2.80, 185.00) =3.78, p = .01 (see Fig. 1). Post hoc analysis
used separate 2 (group) × 3 (response) ANOVAs for each of the three
conditions to examine the signiﬁcant three-way interaction. These re-
vealed only main effects of response for the socially appropriate and vi-
olations conditions; that is, across groups, the most common response
was “normal” for socially appropriate behaviors and “unusual” for viola-
tions. In contrast, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between group and
response in the impolite but understandable condition, F(1.46, 96.49),
p = .01. Patients rated fewer behaviors in this condition as “normal”
than controls, p b .01.
A compositemeasure of ToMwas derived by summing the standard-
ized z-scores of the verbal and non-verbal ToM scores. This composite
measure of ToM correlated positively with the percentage of “normal”Table 1
Basic demographics of patients and controls.
Patients Healthy Controls Signiﬁcance Test
Males:Females 24:19 10:15 χ2(1) = .31
Age (years) 41.53 ± 9.58
(24–60)
41.28 ± 13.83
(19–60)
t(66) = .09
Formal Education (years) 12.37 ± 2.69
(8–18)
14.42 ± 2.63
(10–21)
t(66) =3.05⁎
NART IQ 107.07 ± 10.59
(75–128)
110.76 ± 8.62
(91–124)
t(66) =1.48
Notes: Continuous data expressed as means ± SD (range in parentheses).
⁎ p b .05.responses to inappropriate but understandable behaviors, r(43) = .55,
p b .01. There was also a trend for the composite ToMmeasure to corre-
late negatively with the percentage of “normal” responses to violations,
r(43)=− .30, p= .05. In addition, the composite measure of ToM cor-
related positively with IQ, r(43) = .45, p b .01, and education, r(43) =
.57, p b .01, but not with the SAPS and SANS total scores or any other
demographic. The correlation between ToM and the percentage of
“normal” responses to inappropriate but understandable behaviors in
the social judgment task, however, remained signiﬁcant partialling out
either IQ (p b .01) or years of education (p b .01). In contrast, the corre-
lation between ToM and the percentage of “normal” responses to viola-
tions was no longer signiﬁcant after partialling out either years of
education (p= .27) or IQ (p= .22).4. Discussion
Consistent with previous research (Bora et al., 2009), patients
displayed signiﬁcant deﬁcits in ToM on both verbal and nonverbal mea-
sures but not in task control conditions. Despite their ToM deﬁcits, pa-
tients did not differ signiﬁcantly from controls in their judgments of
behavior in the social judgment task if the behavior was consistent or
clearly inconsistent with social norms. Nevertheless, patients were
less likely to judge social behavior that appeared impolite, but was un-
derstandable if the story characters’ thoughts and intentions were
taken into account, as normal or reasonable. This latter difﬁculty in cat-
egorizing social behavior correlated with ToM independent of either IQ
or years of formal education. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that patients can
recognize when social behavior conforms to normative rules, while
ToM deﬁcits impair their ability to consider other people’s thoughts
and intentions when judging social behavior.Table 2
Performance of patients and controls on the two measures of ToM.
Patients Healthy Controls t-value p-value
Story Comprehension
ToM 7.74 ± 3.27 9.76 ± 2.35 2.70 b .01
Control 3.91 ± .29 3.92 ± .28 .18 .86
Picture Sequencing
False Belief (ToM) 3.92 ± 1.56 5.15 ± .80 3.65 b .01
Social (Control) 5.69 ± .63 5.83 ± .52 .96 .34
Mechanical (Control) 5.49 ± .88 5.79 ± .46 1.56 .13
Capture (Control) 4.12 ± 1.10 4.55 ± 1.27 1.48 .14
Notes. Data expressed as means ± SD.
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is also illustrated by the fact that patients performed similarly to con-
trols in the social control condition of the picture sequencing task. This
general ﬁnding, however, differs from previous research that has
shown social knowledge deﬁcits in patients using more cognitively de-
manding tasks. It appears that while patients may retain knowledge of
normative social behavior, they may have difﬁculty applying this
knowledge to answermore abstract questions or complete tasks that re-
quire higher-level cognitive abilities. Patients’ intact social knowledge
may also be masked by ToM deﬁcits in other tasks, particularly if the
tasks require patients to relate their knowledge of social norms to fea-
tures of social situations that involve other peoples’ thoughts and expe-
riences. Without the ability to take others’ thoughts into account,
patients’ tolerance of impolite behavior will be compromised.
The study was limited by the convenience sampling of patients. In
addition, as the social judgment task was not explicitly matched in dif-
ﬁculty to the ToMmeasures, it is unclear the extent to which normative
social knowledge can be separated from ToM abilities. It remains possi-
ble, for example, that patients performed similarly to controls on the so-
cially appropriate and violations conditions of the social judgment task,
but differently on the ToM tasks, due to the relative difﬁculty of tasks.
Despite these limitations, however, the ﬁndings suggest that social in-
telligence in schizophrenia is not globally impaired. Patients may have
acquired adequate social knowledge of normative behavior before the
onset of their illness. They may continue to be able to demonstrate
this knowledge if the circumstances are not too cognitively demanding
and do not rely on ToM capacity to understand. Remediation of poor
social functioning in schizophrenia may therefore be most productive
when it targets patients’ ToM capacities to be sensitive to others in
social contexts, rather than simply imparting declarative knowledge
about normative social behavior.
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Appendix A. An example vignette from the social knowledge task
Participants categorize italicized sections.
Charlie, 23, had been out of work for several months. On this day his
hopes were high because he was on his way to apply for a job which
seemed just right for him. As Charlie rode the lift to his interview a
stranger said pleasantly, “Nice day, isn’t it?” (SOCIALLY APPROPRIATE)Just then, Charlie happened to see his reﬂection in amirror by the lift
buttons. His hair was sticking up in a peculiar way and he had no comb
with him. He turned to the friendly stranger and asked, “Do you
have a comb I could borrow for a minute please?” (VIOLATION OF
SOCIAL NORMS)
Theman lookedat Charlie and said “Sure thing, I suppose youwant
to borrow a spare pair of my underwear as well.” (IMPOLITE BUT
UNDERSTANDABLE IF THE MAN’S RESPONSE IS UNDERSTOOD AS
IRONIC)
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